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Law and the Quest for Autonomy in the Western 
Tradition 
By Martin Bernier 
|Preamble| 
| This paper shall focus on the evolving features of autonomy and normativity in 
Western societies. The autonomy of Law as a product of deliberate will, regardless 
of other metaphysical or scientific considerations, is perpetually questioned in 
modern discussions of legality. | 
Attempting to provide a legal definition of democracy, the Austrian jurist Hans 
Kelsen depicted it as a regime which aim is to avoid the “torment of 
heteronomy”. Making sure that the law is made by — or in the name of — the 
people that abide by it, the democratic regime indeed avoids the imposition of 
an external law to a body politic. However, fostering autonomy has not always 
been the primary role attributed to law, nor its only purpose in history. It is 
therefore necessary to interrogate the relationship between law and autonomy 
in the Western tradition. The line of questioning here is twofold; it must 
address the issue of the autonomy of law itself and then its ability, as a 
normative tool, to render a society autonomous. The aim of this article is to 
trace the links between the roots of the “rule of law” ideal — instituting the 
autonomy of law — and the will to envision law as a product of wilful human 
deliberation, thus proclaiming autonomy.   
One must begin by considering the Greek roots of the rule of law and the role 
of the Gregorian Reform in affirming the supremacy and the autonomy of law. 
Increasing emphasis is then placed on the impact of the French Revolution in 
redefining law as the product of human reason, distinct from any other 
normative source. Finally, this investigation aims at questioning the 
persistence of this ideal today against the potential emergence of new 
overarching principles, such as economics, threatening the autonomy of 
human reason and its role in the lawmaking process. The first step in enquiring 
about the conceptual links between law and autonomy is to explain how the 
autonomy of law theoretically precedes the use of legal science in an effort to 
foster autonomy. In short, the autonomy of law can be defined as the ability of 
a legislative system to define its own rules and to avoid being ruled by other 
laws. For instance, in a despotic regime, the law is not autonomous as it is 
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subject to the will of the despot. The autonomy of law is therefore 
consubstantial to the idea of the rule of law. The rule of law means that all 
members of a society — including and especially the government — are subject 
to legal rules. This affirms the supremacy of law. Perhaps the most significant 
feature induced by this idea is that the lawmakers themselves are bound by the 
law. This guarantee is a prerequisite to ensure that law cannot be turned 
against the society by a governing minority and threaten its autonomy.   
This idea of the autonomy of law has a long history in the Western tradition of 
legal thought. As Alain Supiot explains, we can trace back this ideal to Ancient 
Greece. In Plato’s Laws for instance one can find the idea that the rulers must 
be the slaves and the servants of the laws.1 Later on, the supremacy of the law 
in the West was strengthened as a consequence of the Gregorian Reform. 
Indeed, the works of Harold Berman have shown how, in the twelfth century, 
the pope’s will to turn the Church of Rome into a state and to spread the canon 
law in Christian states led to an affirmation of the supremacy of the law.  It was 
the coexistence in the same political communities of different autonomous 
legal systems — secular and canon law — that made the supremacy of law in 
these communities possible.  This led to the idea that, as Berman states, “the 
supreme political authority —the king, the pope himself— may make law (…) 
but he may not make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it —lawfully— he 
is bound by it.”2 This vision of the law is still remaining today in Western legal 
traditions where the autonomy of law and the necessity for the rulers to abide 
by it is no longer questioned.   
If Ancient Greece teaches us, through the words of Plato, the importance of the 
rule of law, the democratic regime instituted in Athens was also the first to 
introduce the idea that a city is governed by the laws it has itself made, thus 
fostering autonomy. The linguistic shift from thesmos to nomos during the 
sixth and fifth centuries before Christ outlines this change from a law imposed 
to the citizens to a law made by them.3 This idea, as much as the idea of the 
rule of law, has crossed the centuries and was especially praised by the French 
 
1 Supiot, La gouvernance par les nombres, p. 81 
2 Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 5 
3 Supiot, La gouvernance par les nombres, p. 84 
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revolutionaries of the eighteenth century. Indeed, we can read in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen that “the law is the expression of 
the general will” (Article 6).  It therefore follows from this principle the idea 
that law is the product of wilful human deliberation and that it must be 
adopted after a reasonable debate.4 Law is clearly understood here as a 
normative tool that must enable the society to determine its own governing 
principles and rules, without referring to any transcendental principle. The 
French revolutionaries thus promoted both the autonomy of law, affirming 
that “any society in which the guarantee of rights is not assured, nor the 
separation of powers determined, has no Constitution” (Article 16 of the 
Declaration), and the use of law to render the society autonomous by 
determining rationally its ruling principles. The emphasis placed on reason in 
the quest for autonomy is especially important. In fact, a society can only be 
said to escape the “torment of heteronomy” when it refuses any external source 
of normativity. The French revolutionaries thus rejected the divine principles, 
turning rather to Deist rationalism, in order to truly found their laws in human 
reason. More specifically, the rationality praised by the revolutionaries and 
adopted by their successors was mostly rooted in individualism and 
utilitarianism. This was clearly visible in the Criminal Code enacted by 
Napoleon in 1810 for instance, where more emphasis was placed on deterring 
criminal acts by fear of penalties than on punishment.5 This illustrates the will 
to regulate rationally the behaviours of the citizens rather than condemning 
acts for their intrinsic evilness or their noncompliance with moral standards 
dictated by religion.    
After this historical overview of both the idea of the autonomy of law and its 
aim to foster autonomy in the societies it rules, it is necessary to study how 
these ideals survive today and to analyse which evolutions they went through. 
This paper shall focus on one aspect that has implied major changes in the way 
we conceive of the autonomy of law, namely the preeminent role taken by 
economics in the normative order. This evolution was first analysed by Karl 
Polanyi in The Great Transformation, where he explained the huge impact of 
 
4 Herzog, A Short History of European Law, p. 187 
5 Berman, Law and Revolution II, p. 12 
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the disembedding of the economy on the British society between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to him, the economy used to 
be a sphere of social life among others, playing rather a minor role in it, but, 
following the development of capitalism, it began occupying a preeminent role 
in the organisation of the societies and even became overarching. The direct 
consequence of the growing importance of economics in law is that, instead of 
being seen as the product of wilful human deliberation, it is now argued by 
some that law should be determined in order to maximise individual utilities.6 
This is the approach praised by the ‘Law and Economics’ doctrine of the School 
of Chicago.  
According to the supporters of this economic analysis of law, all citizens must 
be understood as rational actors attempting to maximise their utility7 and the 
legal sanctions are seen as market prices.8 The interesting feature of this 
evolution is that it does not completely reject the earlier principles according 
to which law should be based on human reason but it understands human 
reason only as economic rationality. This emphasis on economic rationality 
necessarily threatens the autonomy of the society as its members, as workers 
and consumers, are seen as mere commodities and automatons trying to 
optimise their behaviours. Moreover, the question here is the direction that the 
society chooses to follow through the laws it enacts. The Greeks for instance 
aimed at reaching a just city whereas the goal of most economic analysts of the 
law is to maximise productivity and growth. The problem with someone not 
respecting a contract is therefore not of a moral nature but rather that “without 
enforceable contracts, people have difficulty cooperating with each other, so 
productivity is relatively low”.9 The autonomy of law and its potential to foster 
autonomous societies is thus a major feature of the Western legal tradition but 
it is not exempt from questionings and threats. The virtue of wilful human 
deliberation is indeed competing today with powerful calculators and the 
divine law rejected by the French revolution could be replaced by the invisible 
hand of market theorised by Adam Smith. 
6 Supiot, Homo juridicus, p. 26 
7 Shavell, Foundations of economic analysis of law, p. 1 
8 Cooter, ‘Expressive Law and Economics’, p. 585 
9 Ibid., p.604 
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